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OPINION AS TO SANITY
Subscribing Witness to Will
A subscribing witness to a will, may testify not only to the
execution of the will by the testator, but to his opinion of the
sanity or insanity, the presence, or not, of testamentary capacity,
and he may do this without previously stating facts which tend
to justify the opinion which he is expressing.' "The subscribing
witnesses" says Rogers, J., "testify their opinion; other witnesses
testify to the appearance of the testator, or to any other particular fact, from which the state of his mind may be inferred."
Again he says, "the very object of placing them around the testator, is to try, judge, and determine whether he is competent to
execute the instrument."' But, the object with which a testator
invites a man to subscribe to his will, must plainly depend on the
testator. There are probably very few testators who intend,
when they invite a man to put his name to the will, that he shall
form, and ultimately express an opinion concerning their sanity.
A will is entitled to probate, or, in an issue devisavit vel non, to
be read in evidence, when its execution only is proved by the witnesses, and not the sanity of the deceased.
Subscribing Witnesses, Conclusiveness
The opinion of the subscribing witnesses, that the testator
was sane, and of testamentary capacity, is not to be treated as

2Easton v. Wireback, 12 W. N., 150; Dickinson v. Dickinson 61 Pa.,
401; Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa., 216.
2

Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa., 27; Egbert v. Egbert, 78 Pa., 326.
sHoar v. Leaman, 2 Mon., 321.
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conclusive.4 He is not always the best witness upon the subject
of sanity. Witnesses who have not attested the will, may be better acquainted with the testator, and their opinion that the testator was insane, may justly outweigh that of the attesting witness
that he was sane.' However, in an application for an issue
devisavit vel non, where there is evidence of insanity, the failure
of the proponents to take the testimony of the scrivener who
wrote the will, and of the subscribing witnesses was said by Green
J., to have "much adverse force," since such testimony is "often
of the greatest assistance, and will "frequently outweigh much
opposing testimony."'
Asserts Sanity
A subscribing witness to a will, by the act of subscribing to
it, asserts the competency of the testator.7 If he does not believe
the testator competent, he is committing a species of fraud. He
may subsequently, in the investigation of the sanity of the testator, testify that the latter was insane. If he does, his testimony
invites strong suspicion.'
It may also be shown that on an earlier occasion he testified that the testator was sane.' The will
may be sustained, although the subscribing witnesses testify that
the testator was insane.1" That one of two subscribing witnesses
testified before the register that he was ignorant of the mental
condition of the testator at the time of executing the will, need

4
McTaggart
5

v. Thompson, 14 Pa., 149.
Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R., 90; Irish v. Smith, 8 S. & R., 573;
Mentzer's
Will, 5 Phila., 206.
6
Ulmer's Appeal, 9 Sadler, 467.
7
Dickson's. Estate, 20 C. C., 152. Hence, proof of the hand writing
of the subscribing witness, now dead, is evidence of the sanity of the
testator. Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa., 368; Hence, also, when a subscribing witness proves the execution of the will he can be cross-examined as
to the insanity of the testator, by the opponents of the will; Egbert v.
Egbert, 78 Pa., 326.
8
Cook's Estate, 16 Phila., 322; Reese v. Stille, 38 Pa., 138; Shotwell's
Estate, 1 Dist., 257; Cline v. Watts, 21 Lanc., 177; Coleman's Estate, 185
Pa., 437.
9
Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa., 151; Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R., 281;
Dickson's Estate, 20 C. C., 152. The general credit of the witness cannot
be impeached by the person calling him.
'0 Masseth v. Masseth, 213 Pa., 434.
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not induce the Orphans' Court to direct an issue.11 A judgment in
favor of the will, in an issue devisavit vel non was affirmed, although the court had excluded evidence that the subscribing
witnesses who while testifying to the execution had said nothing
about the sanity, had said, at the time of the execution of the
will, that the testator was of unsound mind.1" There were three
subscribing witnesses. One of them, A, was not in the state at
the trial of the issue, nor was proof of his handwriting made.
An offer to prove that he had declared that the testatrix "was absolutely childish" when she made the will, was excluded, the
circuit court saying that the will derived no validity from the
subscription of a third witness. Therefore the third witness'
declarations are not receivable.-3 If the subscribing witness has
subscribed, thinking that the paper is not a will, he is not within
the category of witnesses impeaching the honesty of his own
act. 4
Subscribing Witnesses to Deeds
The subscribing witnesses to a deed, are not like those to a
will, in respect to the power to express opinions concerning the
mental capacity of the executant of the instrument. The latter
we have seen, may express opinions concerning the soundness of
mind of the testator, without prefixing to them a description of
the facts which have induced them. The witnesses to a deed,
are not privileged above non-subscribing witnesses. They must
testify to facts which have created the opinion which they are
about to express, before expressing it. The reason assigned for
the difference between witnesses to deeds, and witnesses to wills,

"McLean's Estate, 2 W. N. C., 338.

12Hoar v. Leaman, 2 Mon. 321. A subscribing witness being dead,
his handwriting is proved. The opponents of the will might prove that he
had declared that the testator was. insane. Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa., 151.
3
" Fox v. Evans, 3 Y., 506. Subscribing witnesses supported the will
before the register but on the petition for an issue, they denied the competency4of tbktestator, in Eddey's Appeal, 109 Pa., 406.
1 Cummins' Estate, 7 Dist., 198.
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is not satisfactory. Says Greenleaf, as quoted by Thompson, J,
"the attesting witnesses are regarded in the law as persons placed
round the testator, in order that no fraud may be practiced upon
him in the execution of the will, and to judge of his capacity."
But subscribing witnesses are not placed and never have been
placed by the law, around the testator, in Pennsylvania. They
are no more required to give validity to a will, than to give validity to a deed. When they attest either will or deed, they do
so, simply because they have been requested to do so, by the grantor or testator. Unsatisfactory as is the reason of the distinction,
it is clear that "on the point of sanity or capacity of a grantor
to make a deed, the subscribing witnesses must testify to facts,
as other witnesses are required to do on the question of competency to contract, the fact being collateral to the object of
their attestation."' 6
Deeds-Sanity of Grantor
The grantor's possession or want of mental capacity, may
be proved by the opinion of non-expert witnesses, whether they
be attesting witnesses, or not, after they have described facts
which warrant their opinion. The opinion may be that the grantor did not' or that he did'" possess capacity to execute the
transaction. Until facts are stated by the witness, he is not allowed to express an opinion. It is not enough that other witnesses may have stated facts which would have warranted an
opinion by them. Each witness' facts must justify the opinion
which he is called to express. 9
Nature of the Opinion
There are degrees of mental weakness, with some of which,
the testator, or grantor may nevertheless make some valid wills
or deeds, while the making of others would not be possible. A
15Dean v. Fuller, 40 Pa., 474. In Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa., 151, Rogers,
J. says that the reason the handwriting of a subscribing witness to a will,
may, in his absence, be proved, is that "no man would attest the will of
any but a sane person." .But why should the subscribing witness to a
deed be any the more willing to subscribe the deed of an insane person?
' 81d.;- Hepler v. Hosack, 197 Pa., 631.
"7Hepler v. Hosack, 197 Pa., 631; Moorhead v. Scovel, 210 Pa., 446.
' 8 Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa., 98; Moorehead v. Scovel, 210 Pa., 446.
' 9Elcessor v. Elcessor, 146 Pa., 359; 1st Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106
Pa. 37.
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simple will might be within the power of the maker, while a complex will, disposing of a large amount of property to many persons and creating intricate limitations, might not be. Yet, it has
been assumed that the witness may say whether the testator was
fit to "make a will," 20 any will, was "fit to do business or make
a will."' 2 1 Woodward, J., thought it unusual to show a particular

will to a physician, and ask him whether his patient had capacity
to understand it.2 2 Yet this is an opinion on a matter of law as
well as fact. A witness must know what testamentary capacity
means, before his judgment that the testator had or had not such
capacity could be of value. 2' The opinion, even of an expert
that the testator had not "testamentary capacity," is of very little
value, unless the expression is defined, when the weight of the
testimony shows capacity. 24 Yet opinions equally vague, are
often admitted. The opinion was received that a grantor in a
deed was not "competent to transact important legal business.2"
The expression of opinion may take various shapes. Having recited conversations with the testator, a non-subscribing witness said "he was just as rational as any man could be." 26 The
witness should not be confined to the statement that the testator
was crazy. He may say that he was not "capable of making a
will,

' 27

That he had not sufficient mind and memory to take

care of himself and manage his own affairs ;28 that he was not
competent to make a will or do any kind of business ;2" that he

20

Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa., 342; Wogan v. Small, 11 S, & R., 141;
Whittaker's
Estate 15 Phila., 574; Palmer's Estate, 219 Pa., 303.
21
Englert v. Englert, 198 Pa., 326. In Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa., 586604; Williams, J., thinks the question, was he sane or insane, better than
was 22he competent or not to make a will. Swails v. White, 149 Pa., 261.
Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa., 191.
23
Shreiner v. Shreiner, 178 Pa., 57. Eddey's Appeal 109 Pa., 406;
Palmer's
Estate, 12 Phila., 124.
24
Draper's Estate, 215 Pa., 314.
25
Hepler v. Hosack, 197 Pa., 631.
26
Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa., 216.
27
Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa., 339. It is not necessary that one
should be crazy in order to be incapable of making a will.
28
Newhard v. Gundt, 132 Pa., 324.
29Swails

v. White, 149 Pa., 261.
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was not capable of transacting any business six months previous
to his death, the will having been written one month before
death."0 A physician was allowed, without error, to say that a
man, subject to a described delusion, would not be able to make a
will unaffected by it."1
When the testator has general mental power, but is subject
to delusions which are alleged to vitiate his will, or deed, the opinion whether he was competent to make a will or whether he was
sane or insane, is improper. It overlooks "the distinction" between general insanity and the existence of an insane delusion."
The opinion ought to be concerning the influence of the delusion
upon the purpose of the testator which his will expresses to exclude his children from a share in his estate 32 or to make any disposition of property. An opinion that certain ideas and opinions
of the testator would affect his judgment in the disposal of his
property, is correctly excluded for the reason that "the fact that
the judgment is controlled by one's ideas and opinions" astutely
observes Williams, J., "is an evidence of sanity rather than of
the existence of insane delusion. 33
Facts Which Iust Be Proved
The facts proof of which must precede the witness's expression of opinion, must be such as reasonably to warrant the opinion to be expressed. A fact showing a good state of mind,
would not justify the forming or expressing of a judgment of insanity. Facts as consistent with sanity as with insanity, would
not authorize an opinion of insanity.' The testatrix, e. g., on two
or three occasions was seen by a witness lying unconscious with
eyes closed and mouth open. "Unconsciousness" says Penrose,
J., "at five o'clock in the morning, with the eyes closed, and in
many cases with the mouth open, is the normal condition of the
majority of mankind, and its existence at other times, with a

3
°Ins.
31

Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa., 255.
Thomas v. Carter, 170 Pa., 272.
32
Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa., 586.
'3165 Pa., 586. Does opinion control judgment, or is opinion judgment ?
1
The court refused to allow an opinion of the witness, after he had
stated facts!. Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa., 401.
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slumbering invalid, is by no means incompatible with entire mental soundness during waking hours."2 Failure to recognize a
witness, possibly because of inability to see without glasses, and
taking no part in a conversation carried on by others, does not
justify an opinion that the testatrix is "idiotic" or incapable of
making a will.8 That the will does not dispose of property as
the day before making it, and on other occasions, the testator
had said he desired to dispose of it, would not warrant the opinion of incapacity,4 nor would the failure of the testator on one
occasion, to recognize a person whom he has known for years.'
The Supreme Court in reversing a decision that the will was void,
refused to attach weight to the opinion of two physicians, who
made a transient observation of the testatrix, and who concluded
that she was unfit to make a will from her looks and her age,
and from the uncleanness of herself and her house.'
That the testator has told the witness that he does not know
what he is worth, is said to have very little value as an indication
of insanity because property may fluctuate in value, or the statement may have been made to evade an impertinent question.9
Old age being assigned for the witness' opinion that a testator
was insane he saying "he was 87 years old and of course he could
not be of sound mind. My grandmother died at that age and I
know she was not," the opinion was found to be baseless.'"
Possibly, when the witness is a neighbor, who has known the
testator for many years, and has been in the habit of visiting him,
who was acquainted with the testator's former state of mind, and
could mark the change therein at the time of the interview, it is
not necessary that the facts stated by him should as cogently
justify the opinion, as in other cases.7
2Whittaker's will, 15 Phila. 574. Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa., 495;
First Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 12 W. N., 150; Stokes v. Miller, 10 W. N.,
241; Stayer v. McCarthy, 110 Pa., 339; Newland v. Yundt, 132 Pa., 324;
Co. 3Trust Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa., 255.
Williams' Estate, 13 Phila., 302.
4
Masseth v. Masseth, 213 Pa., 434.
5
Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa., 339.
6
Englert v. Englert 198 Pa., 326.
7
Swails v. White, 149 Pa., 261. The testator had cancer in the neck.
The witness described him as lying in a kind of stupor, not able to carry
on a conversation.
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Kinds of Facts
Conversations with the grantor, testator, etc., are frequently
the facts referred to by the witness as the sources of his opinion,"
e.g. his magnifying his wealth, 2 his swift transitions from "moralizing"to lowest obscenities.' 3 It seems to have been supposed in
Pidcock v. Potter,' 4 that to talk disparagingly of the authorities
of the city of Williamsport with regard to their management of
affairs, might be some indication of insanity, although the current
judgment of the times is that to talk approvingly of the civic authorities would the rather manifest it. Testimony delivered at
an audit, may be recited as evidence of sanity.' 5 Inability to
recognize one with whom the testator had been well acquainted,
which is not the result of defective vision, is said to be "strong
evidence of imbecillity of mind."" The countenance and appearance of the testator, his looking with a vacant stare, are facts
on which an opinion was founded. Tilghman, C. J., observes
"The countenance gives strong indications of the state of the
mind. What the countenance is, is matter of fact, depending to
be sure, in some measure, an opinion. All men would not form
the same opinion of the same countenance. One might think it
indicated childishness; another not. But that is no reason the
Paxson, J., however thinks it
evidence should be excluded.'
more than doubtful whether this can be applied to countenances
distorted by paralysis. He also suggests that an opinion based
on the countenance, could be given only after the witness had described peculiarities in it, which would tend to show insanity.""
Opinion Based on Nature of Will
The witness may not express an opinion of unsoundness of
mind of the testator, based on the fact that the will gives no ade'9 Eddey's Appeal, 109 Pa., 406.

'0 Naffle's estate, 134' Pa., 492. Cf. Elcessor v. Elcessor, 146 Pa., 359;
Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa., 72, 79.
"Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa., 216; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa., 342.
1268 Pa., 342.
"3Bitner v. Bitner 65 Pa., 347.
2468 Pa., 342.
25 First Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa., 37.
' 6 Irish v. Smith, 8 S. & R., 573.
178 S. & R., 573; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa., 117.
'sFirst Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 12 W. N., 150. But the appearance
had not been described in Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa., 117.
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quate part of the estate to his only child. To the question, from
your knowledge of the man, would he have cut his only child off
with $50, had he been in sound mind, the answer "I do not, as his
son is worthy of his property, and needs it, being a poor working
man," was not properly receivable "8 Yet, a delusion being
shown to exist, the will may be set agide, if on account of its
provisions, it is found to have been the product of this delusion.
The jury may consider whether the testator overlooked the relation of his children to himself, "and his own parental obligation,
under the influence of an insane impulse or the direction of an
imaginary communication from God or from the spirits of the
dead.""9 The provisions of a will however, may be so absurd as
to warrant a jury, though not a witness, in inferring that it was
produced by an insane man.2"
Experts Must State Facts
When an expert expresses an opinion upon a hypothetical
question, the question presupposes that there is evidence before
the court or jury, from which the assumed facts may be found
to exist. The expert gives no testimony respecting the existence
of the facts. When they are testifying to an opinion founded on
their own observations, it is necessary, says Penrose, J., that they
"state the circumstances or symptoms from which they draw
their conclusions."2 They may, of course, state the facts which
tend to show the mental incapacity of which they are testifying,2 2
and the party against whom they testify, may elicit from them on
cross-examination the facts which have induced their opinion.
Hypothetical Questions-Non-Experts
Non-expert witnesses cannot express opinions whether one,
of whom facts are supposed, was or was not sane. They cannot,
e. g., on cross-examination, having testified in chief that the testator was sane, he asked what their opinion of the testator would

'8 Title Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa., 255. Cf. Spence v. Spence, 4 W., 165.

"9Taylor v. Trieh, 165 Pa. 586.
OSpence v. Spence, 4 W., 165. "There is nothing in the will itself,"
said Fell, J., "that was unnatural or that suggests that it was the product
of an abnormal mind." Graham's Estate, 225 Pa., 314.
21
Palmer's Estate, 12 Phila., 124.
22
Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa., 342.
2
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be, if they knew certain facts concerning him; e. g., that he was
unable to learn to spell, at school, knew not the value of money
or property, having bought two bushels of turnips at 25c per
bushel, had offered in pay $1.50, and had asked if that was
enough; that he insisted on one occasion that seven dollars were
not enough to pay for an article, the price of which as told him
was 18 s. 3 d. "The [non-expert] witness' opinion" says Duncan,
J., "of the capacity of a man must not be founded on the hearsay
of others, or the oath of others."2
Hypothetical Questions-Experts
To an expert, an alienist, a physician," a question may be
put whether one of whom such and such facts were true, was, or
not, of sound mind, of testamentary capacity, etc. The facts
assumed should be such as some credible testimony in the case
tends to prove ;5 otherwise the court or jury being unable to find
the existence of the facts, would be unable properly to make
any use of the opinion. The facts do not need to be those which
the evidence tendered by the opposite party tends to establish.
The opponent of a will, e. g., in framing a hypothesis for the
judgment of an expert witness, is not bound to include in it facts
alleged by the proponents which he denies, nor facts which may
be considerd irrelevant to the matter of testimony capacity.26
An opinion on a hypothetical case, given in a former trial by a
witness, who is not present at the second, may be given in evidence at the second, if the evidence at the second tends to sustain
the facts assumed in the question. The facts established at the
second trial do not need to be precisely the same as those proved
at the first. If the essential facts assumed in the hypothesis,
might be found by the jury from the evidence given at the second
trial, the opinion is admissible. It is enough if the facts assumed
After the court
are reasonably consistent with the evidence."
23

Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R., 90.
Physicians were treated as experts. First Nat. Bank v. Wireback,
106 Pa., 37; Kanes' Estate, 206 Pa. 204; Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127
Pa., 564, 598; Richmond's Estate, 206 Pa., 219; Thomas v. Carver, 170
Pa., 25
272; Draper's Estate, 215 Pa., 314.
Boyer's Estate, 13 Phila., 254.
26
Miller's Estate, 179 Pa., 645. The physician was asked as to the
effect27of prolonged alcoholism and locomotor ataxia upon the mind.
First Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa., 37.
24
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has received the opinion of experts as to insanity upon a hypothetical question, if it subsequently determines that the evidence
would not warrant the jury's finding the important facts assumed in the question, it properly withdraws the question of insanity from the jury.2" The existence of a dispute concerning
the facts, can scarcely warrant the rejection of an opinion based
on the assumption of their existence. It is for a jury or a court
to determine, when there is a dispute, what the facts are. Yet,
the opinion of an expert of "apparently high professional standing" that the testator was deficient in testamentary capacity, was
said to be "rendered worthless by the fact that he had no personal
acquaintance with the testator, and the hypothetical case put to
him was based largely on facts which were disputed.""9
Witnesses in Double Capacity
A witness may not only be an expert, but he may have become acquainted with the individual whose insanity is in question,
and have formed an opinion concerning his mental state, from observations made of him. He may express the opinion that the
testator was not fit to make a will 1 that, having paresis, he was insane.2 The physician may describe facts which he has observed,
impaired memory, depression of spirits, feeble mind, hallucinations,3 senile dementia.4 A physician attending a dying man, a
short time before he made a deed, may say from what he saw and
knew of the sickness of the grantor, that he was not capable of
transacting any legal business, without previously stating facts.'
Physicians who had seen the testator at times ranging from five
months to 4 years before the will was written, testified that he
was suffering from paresis, a disease which is progressive and
incurable, and that the disease would incapacitate him for the
intelligent consideration of any subject some weeks before it
caused his death. But, thought Fell, J., their opinion of what
would happen in the future was not entitled to greater weight
28
Wilson
2

v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495.
0Richmond's Estate, 206 Pa., 219.
1
Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa., 342. Boyer's Estate, 13 Phila., 254.
2
Miller's Estate, 14 Dist., 89.
2
Shreiner v. Shreiner, 177 Pa., 57.
4
Shreiner v. Shreiner, 177 Pa., 57; Waller's Estate, 20 Dist., 181.
5
Hepler v. Hosack, 197 Pa., 631.
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than the clear, positive and uncontradicted testimony of disinterested witnesses as to what did actually happen, viz. that the
deceased retained to the time of making the will, the perfect use
of his reasoning faculties.'
Declared Opinion of Devisee
In inquiries devisavit vel non, the opinions which some of
several legatees may have expressed, are not admissible, because
unfortunately, the will must be found valid altogether or void altogether, and it would be improper to affect one legatee with an
admission made by another, the legatees being not joint but several.' But in an ejectment in 1868 by the heirs against the devisee, under a will which had been sustained in an issue from the
Register's Court, the plaintiffs were permitted to prove admissions
by the devisee, of a want of testamentary capacity, at or before
the time when the alleged will was made, or within a short period
thereafter. The widow elected to take under the interstate law,
and apparently all the heirs except the devisee, were plaintiffs,
asking to obtain the land despite the will. There was no one
to be injured by the declarations of the defendant, but himself.'
Nature of Capacity
When a witness expresses an opinion of the presence or absence of capacity to make a deed or will, or perform some other
act, it is important to know what his conception is, of the nature
and degree of this capacity. An opinion which embodies a
misconception of the nature and degree, is of no value.9 When
the question is whether a grantor had sufficient capacity to make
a particular conveyance of a piece of land, the capacity does not
embrace the ability to understand the form, and arrangement and
technical language of the deed. "Every business man," says
Potter, J., "knows what it means to make a deed for his property,
but what does he know of the formal parts of the instrument?
When he is said to understand a deed, it is never meant that he
comprehends the legal effect which lawyers may impart to the
6
Grahar's
7

Estate 225 Pa., 314.
Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa., 339; Clark v. Morrison, 25 Pa., 453;
Irwin v. West, 813/ Pa., 157; Yorke's Estate, 185 Pa., 61; Hoar v. Leaman, 2 Mona., 321; Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa., 191.
SThompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa., 368.
9
Klein's Estate, 207 Pa., 191.
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words employed. Mental capacity to execute a deed does not
include any such ability as that."'"
A deed is composed of
words. What must a grantor understand, if not the legal effect
of these words? Not truly the meaning of each word, or of each
phrase, not the meaning of grant, bargain and sell, or to have and
to hold, but surely he must know at least one meaning of the
whole series of words. He must know that the signing and delivery of the deed will terminate his ownership of the land described in it, and pass it to the grantee. With reference to a will,
Woodward, J., said" that, for the testator to "understand" his
will, it is not necessary that he should comprehend "the possible
legal effect which lawyers and judges may impart to the words he
employs, but he should be able to make an intelligent choice between one disposition and another. He must know the property
he possesses, the persons and objects he desires to benefit by his
will. But, "it is not necessary that he should collect all these
in one review. If he understands in detail all he is about, and
chooses with understanding and reason between one disposition
and another, it is enough."' 2
Value of the Opinion
The opinion of the witness is simply an ingredient of the
evidence which is submitted to the court or jury. They must determine for themselves what weight such opinion has, as evidence. 3 Facts, other than opinions, are presented, and they
are the primary evidence on which a jury must rely, and not the
opinion of witnesses as to the soundness of mind." 'it is the
opinion of the jury, founded on facts and circumstances proved
[but opinions are also facts] not the opinion of witnesses which
is to decide the case."' 4 Opinions when offered to established
facts are not entiled to much respect.' 5 The value of the opinion
must depend on the facts on which it is based,' 6 as well as the
'°Moorhead v. Scovel, 210 Pa., 446.

""Daniel
v. Daniel, 39 Pa., 191.
12Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa., 191; McMasters v. Blair, 29 Pa., 298;
Moorehead v. Scovel, 210 Pa., 446.
"Newhard v. Yundt, 132 Pa., 324; Ins. Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa., 255.
14Browne v. Molliston, 3 Wh., 129.
'Draper's Estate, 215 Pa., 314; Mulholland's Estate, 217 Pa., 65.
16Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa., 339; Ins. Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa., 255.
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capacity of the witness to draw inferences from them. If facts
proved show mental power, the court or jury could not be persuaded by opinions of witnesses who were ignorant of these facts,
or had not given them proper weight. In Green's estate" a
lawyer testified that the testatrix was insane and unfit to make a
will. Says the Court, "The testimony of this witness is of very
little weight-not sufficient to go to a jury or to justify a verdict
against the will," because the witness himself stated that he had
acted at the time referred to, as her counsel, that she, as executrix had settled her father's estate, had sold real estate and performed other important business matters. The opinion of experts and others based on observations made several days before
the making of a deed by one who is sick unto death, as to what
must have been her condition at the making of a deed, is entitled
to but little weight as against the evidence of those who observed
her just before and after and at the time of executing the deed."8
Witnesses Must State Facts
Witnesses who are not attesting witnesses to wills, must
before expressing an opinion concerning the mental capacity of
testator, grantor, etc., state facts, which have led him to his opinion.9 . If there are several witnesses, the opinion of each, must
be proceeded by a statement by him of facts which sustain his
opinion.2"
Question for Court
Whether the facts proved, reasonably justify the opinion
which is. to be expressed and whether the opinion is admissible,
is to be determined by the court. " ' Hence it is the right of .the
opposite party to cross-examine the witness, before the court allows him to express his opinion.22 The error of the court, in
allowing the expression of opinions before the disclosure by the
1"140 Pa., 157.

'SMoorhead v. Scovel, 210 Pa., 446.
9
1 Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa., 27; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa.,
401; Hepler v. Hosack, 197 Pa., 631; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa., 495;
Pidcock
v. Potter, 68 Pa., 342; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R., 90.
20 First Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa. 37; Elcessor v. Elcessor, 146
Pa., 359.
21Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa., 495; Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa., 339;
Ins. 22
Co. v. Gray, 150 Pa., 255; First Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa., 37.
First Nat. Bank v. Wireback, 106 Pa., 37.
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witnesses of sufficient facts, may be cured by the Court's charge
to the jury that these opinions are of little weight, standing alone,
and are to be considered in connection with the testimony showing the ability of the witness to form a correct opinion upon the
subject. If the witness has been frequently with the testator, has
had business with him, conversed with him, so that his opportunities for judging of the condition of his mind were very good,
his opinion on that subject will be entitled to weight proportional
to his oportunity to form a judgment.2" Apparently, the capacity
of the witness to form a judgment, although proved otherwise
than by proof of her observation of facts which would warrant
an inference of insanity, will justify the expression of an opinion
by the witness.
23

Rocke v. Wegge, 202 Pa., 169.

MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. IVINS
Evidence that a Man Indicted for Receiving Stolen Goods had on Previous
Occasions Received Stolen Goods is Admissible Without Proof that
he knew the Same to have been Stolen.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Indictment for receiving from Jacobs on August 7, 1913, goods, knowing them to have been stolen. The Commonwealth offered proof that on
five previous occasions within four weeks, Ivins had bought from Jacobs
other goods, not of the same sort which goods had been stolen.
Conviction. Motion for a new trial.
McKeown, for plaintiff.
Morosini, for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
HABERSTROH, J. The facts of the case in question are somewhat
evasive in respect to the knowledge of the defendant upon the receipt of
the goods on the five previous occasions alluded to in the statement of
the facts. The insufficiency of the facts in this respect creates two specific and distinct questions, which may be inferred as follows:
1. That the defendant received the goods on the five previous occasions not knowing them to be stolen.
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2. That the defendant received the goods on the five previous occasions with the knowledge that they were stolen goods.
The indictment charges the offense of having received stolen goods
knowing them to have been stolen and, to show guilty knowledge on the
-part of the defendant, the Commonwealth was permitted to put in
evdience the former dealings between the defendant, and one Jacobs, from
whom the goods in question were received. The defendant objected to
the admittance of these former dealings between the two parties and
now brings the controversy into this court on a motion for a new trial.
Receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, is a crime
in which the GUILTY KNOWLEDGE of the theft must be established
to justify a conviction. It is for-this reason that on a trial for this
offense, evidence of a former receipt by the accused is admissible. L. R.
A., Vol. 62, 0. S., 269.
Evidence that other goods were previously bought by the accused of
the same person, is not admissible to show guilty knowledge 6n the part
of the accused that he knew the goods in this specific instance to be stolen.
Thus under the first inference viz. that the defendant received the
goods not knowing them to be stolen, the evidence of such former transactions would be inadmissible to establish the guilty knowledge on the part
of the defendant, which is a prime essential before the crime of receiving
stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen can be established.
The fact that a man has on previous occasions, purchased goods, from
a certain man and later bought goods which are alleged to be stolen goods,
does not tend to show that the defendant through his previous dealings
knew that the goods alleged to be stolen were purchased by him with
that knowledge. The facts of the present case do not intimate or specifically declare that there were certain suspicious facts or incidents attending the purchase in question or the other sales referred to, so as to
place the defendant in a position whereby through a little investigation
he would have learned the illegality of the sale. Therefore under the
first interpretation the evidence was inadmissible and it was error for the
court below to allow its introduction into the case as evidence to establish guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant.
The consideration of the case under the second interpretation of the
facts is more of a mooted question and forms grounds either way as to
whether such evidence as sought to be admitted here can or cannot be
admissible to establish guilty knowledge.
It is a general rule that should be observed, "That it is incompetent
upon trial for one offense to prove that the accused has committed another
offense, not connected therewith. Nor can particular acts of criminality
or immorality not ccnnected with the facts constituting the crime for which
the accused is tried be used as evidence against him to prejudice the jury
or create a probability of guilt. The apparent exception is when knowledge of a particular act is an ingredient of the crime and must be affirmatively shown. Copperman v. People of N. Y., 56 N. Y., 591.
Competent to show that defendant, charged with having received
stolen goods, had prior to time in question received property which he
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knew to be stolen, from.persons from whom he received the property in
question, as tending to show guilty knowledge, and competent to show the
previous dealings between the parties. State v. Feuerhaken, 90 Iowa,
299.
Evidence of receiving similar goods to those described in the indictment is admissible as tending to show guilty knowledge. State v. Kabib,
18 R. I., 558; Reg. v. Mulhollen, 1 Fost. & F., 51; Comm. v. Cas., 2 Luz;
Reg. 137 Shaffner v. Comm., 72 Pa., 60.
On question of motive or scienter evidence of like criminal acts at or
about the time charged is proper to be admitted in evidence. Bersh v.
State, 133 Ind., 434.
The above cited cases all tend to prove that evidence of the receiving
of SIMILAR goods to those described in the indictment is admissible
to show guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant. The indictment in
the present case does not say that he, the defendant in the present case
stole or received goods SIMILAR to those with which he is charged in
the indictment but, specifically states that he had bought of Jacobs
OTHER GOODS, that is of a different kind to those described in the indictment. The question then is, can the receipt of different goods than
those in question under the same circumstances as existed in the case of
receiving similar goods be admitted in evidence to establish guilty knowledge.
"To show a guilty knowledge, other instances may be proved, even
tho they may be subject to other indictments and are antecedent to the
receiving in quesion. Whart. Cr. Law Sec. 1889.
Mr. Justice Woodward in Kilroy v. Comm. 89 Pa., 480, in commenting
on Mr. Wharton's proposition said,--"This statement may be too general
and should perhaps be qualified by the application of the terms of Cr. Law,
that "Evidence of some other felony or transaction than that on trial
committed upon or against a different person at a different time in which
the defendant participated cannot be used against him until proof has been
given establishing or tending to establish the offense with which he is
charged and showing some circumstances between the different transactions that will warrant a presumption that the latter grew out of and was
to some extent intended to be induced by some circumstances connected
with the former. 2 Russ. Crimes 777.
Counsel for the appellant quotes the following proposition from
Coleman v. The People 55 N. Y. 81.
"Upon the trial of an indictment for receiving stolen goods, it is
not competent for the prosecution to show for the purpose of proving
SCIENTER, that the accused had received other property from other
persons knowing the same to have been stolen."
Quoting from the opinion in State v. Ward 49 Conn. 429., a case in
which the identical question under consideration is decided and it is therein stated that the evidence of such former transactions, whereby stolen
goods were received by the defendant, is admissible to establish guilty
knowledge.
The cases of New York, Coleman v. The People, 55 N. Y., 81,
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Copperman v. The People 56 N. Y. 591., and Coleman v. The People 58
N. Y., 555, may seem on casual examination to stand for the following
proposition. "That receiving in former instances must not only have
been from the same party from whom the goods in question were stolen,
but they must have been stolen from the same person as others and
SIMILAR in character and so the court states the fact, but it is not held
in either of them that this was essential to make the evidence admissible.
In the first case the court says, "That it is incompetent for the Comm.
to show for the purpose of proving scienter that accused has received
other property from other persons, knowing the same to have been stolen."
Of course the property must have been received from the same person
from whom the goods in question were received in order to show guilty
knowledge, but that the property must be stolen from the same party or
must be SIMILAR in character, none of these cases decide. There is no
reason for such a doctrine. If the accused knows when he receives the
goods that he receives them from a professional thief who has made him
a receiver of proceeds of various thefts before; it adds no force to the
evidence that the thefts were all from the same party or that the goods
were SIMILAR in character.
Wharton's Cr. Law, Vol. 1. sec. 634 refers to People v. Rando, 3
Parker's Crim. R. 335. as follows, "Prisoners indicted for receiving
stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, the Comm. offered
evidence of several acts of like character, with a view of showing guilty
knowledge and the evidence was admitted," and in Vol. 2 sec. 1890, he
says "To show guilty knowledge other instances of receiving may be
proved even tho they may be subject of other indictments and antecedent
to the receiving in question."
In a case of forgery, where it was sought to admit in evidence other
acts of the defendant to show criminal intent, the evidence was held
admissible and the view of the court coincides with the doctrines as laid
down in Coleman v. The People Supra. People v. Corbin 56 N. Y. 363.
In the indictment where the defendant was charged with having
received stolen horses, evidence tending to prove that in other transactions
and at other times defendant had received horses and OTHER goods
and delivered to defendant by agreement, such evidence was held competent as tending to establish guilty knowledge. Goldsberry State 92
Neb. (N. W.) 906.
On trial for receiving stolen property, evidence of receiving OTHER
stolen property than that charged in the indictment is competent to show
a systematic plan on the part of the defendant, to commit the crime
charged. 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1; Devoto v. Comm., 3 Met. Ky., 417; State
v. Crawford, 39 S. C., 343; State v. Ward, 49 Conn., 429.
In Comm. v. Johnson, defendant was indicted for receiving stolen
goods viz., two stoves and the Comm. offered to show the receiving of
other goods, not similar to those described in the indictment for the
purpose of showing guilty knowledge. The court held that these transactions were admissible in evidence as tending to establish guilty knowledge and despite the fact that the statute of limitation was a bar to an
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action upon them they were nevertheless admissible in evidence.
On a trial for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been
stolen, his having received other goods which were stolen of the same
owner even so far back that the statute of limitation would bar a prosecution, may lie proved in order to convince the jury of his knowledge
that the goods for the receiving which he is on trial, were stolen. Dr.
Trickett on Cr. Law, Vol. 2, sec. 1041. Also Comm. v. Johnson Supra.
In Kilroy v. The Comm. 89 Pa. 429. The defendant was indicted for
receiving stolen cigars and to show guilty knowledge, other transactions
were offered to establish such knowledge. The offenses charged the
receiving stolen paper on one occasion and the time of the respective
occurrences were Sept., November and December and the objection of
the defendants that such acts were too remote to establish guilty knowledge was overruled by the court and admitted in evidence to establish
guilty knowledge.
Under the second interpretation of the presented facts we have the
following:
1. That the defendant received'the goods on the previous occurrences
with the knowledge that they were stolen.
2. That the defendant received the goods in question from the same
person from whom the goods received on the four previous occasions
were received.
3. That the transactions covered the space of four weeks.
4. That the offer of the Comm. to admit the five previous occurrences
in evidence was to show that the defendant possessed guilty knowledge
in the receipt of the goods in question.
5. That the goods in question were dissimilar and different from
those received by the defendant on the five previous occasions.
In view of the above stated facts- and the law stated as -applicable
thereto, the court committed no error in allowing the Comm. to show
that on five previous occasions the defendant had received goods from
Jacobs, for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge. Under the first
interpretation of the facts the admittance .of the testimony was error by
the trial judge and would furnish sufficient grounds for a new trial.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The possession of stolen goods- on previous occasions, is admissible
to prove knowledge that goods received on a subsequent occasion were
stolen on the theory (1) that the possession on former occasions was
likely to lead to a knowledge or warning that the goods then received
were stolen; (2) that this warning would naturally warn the defendant that
the goods received on subsequent occasions were stolen.
2. In order that the warning given by the former receipts should
affect the subsequent receipts there must be a similarity (the degree of
which has not been clearly stated) between the transactions. It is generally held to be sufficient if the goods were received from the same
person.
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1. Three doctrines have been announced by the courts as to the character of the possession required to serve as a warning of the stolen
character of the goods; (1) that mere possession suffices; (2) that
possession must have been obtained under suspicious circumstances; (3)
that knowing possession alone is sufficient.
The third doctrine is that adopted by most of the courts in the
United States. It is assumed by the courts that the receipt of stolen
goods is in itself always more or less likely to result eventually in a warning that the goods were stolen because the owner is apt to follow them up
and reclaim them and because there are almost always some suspicious
circumstances attending the receipt.
According to this doctrine it is not necessary to show actual
knowledge of the stolen character of the goods received on the previous
occasions or to prove suspicious circumstances accompanying the receipts
on those occasions. 1 Wig. Ev., 324; 34 Cyc., 528.
The evidence offered by the commonwealth was therefore properly
admitted.
KEMP v. ORBISON
When Personal Property which is the Subject of a Conditional Sale is
Destroyed without Negligence on the Vendee's Part, the Vendee is
Nevertheless Liable to the Vendor for the Unpaid Purchase Price.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kemp sold to Orbison a piano for $500. The agreement was that
the price should be paid in quarterly installments of $25; that the piano
should continue to be the property of Kemp until the last installment
was paid. After $300 had been paid a fire destroyed the piano and
Orbison made no more payments. This was an action for the remaining
$200 with interest.
Nowicki, for defendant.
Ginter, for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BASEHORE, J. Was this a conditional sale?
A conditional sale is-a sale in which the transfer of title to the thing
sold to the purchaser, or his retention of it is made to depend upon the
performance of some condition. 6 A. & E. 496.
It is the distinguishing feature of the so-called conditional sale that
the title to or property in the goods remains in the seller until payment
of the price; but the buyer is entitled to the possession and use of the
goods until default in payment. 35 Cyc. 352.
Whenever it appears from the contract between parties that the owner
of personal property has transferred the possession thereof to another,
reserving to himself the naked title, solely for the purpose of securing to
himself the payment of the price agreed between them, the contract is
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necessarily a conditional sale and not a bailment. Forrest v. Nelson
Bro's. Co. 108 Pa. 481.
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we can
say without hesitation that Kemp had a mere naked title solely for the
purpose of securing to himself the payment of the price agreed between
him and Orbison, and Orbison had the use, possession and enjoyment
of the property with the right to acquire the absolute title; and that the
transaction was therefore a conditional sale.
What is the liability of the vendee in a conditional sale in case the
personal property is lost or destroyed before the purchase money is paid
in full while the goods are in the vendee's possession?
There is a want of harmony among the authorities on the question
of the right of the seller retaining title to property until payment of the
purchase money, to recover the amount unpaid where the property has
been lost or destroyed without fault of the vendee, the preponderance
numerically, though on varying grounds, being in favor of the seller's
right to recover.
There may possibly be room for contention that the conflict is more
apparent than real, and that some of the cases holding the opposite may
be distinguished, while the variation of the remaining cases from the
wcight of authority is due to a failure to observe the distinction between
executory sales on condition where a new transaction, after payment of
the purchase money, is necessary to complete the transfer of title and
those where the title is retained as security, passing upon payment by
the vendee.
The conditional vendee having possession subject only to the vendor's
reservation of title as security for the unpaid purchase money is in a
sense the owner; if he pays the purchase money, he becomes the absolute
owner, "without any new transaction or bill of sale". Osborne v.
South Shore Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 326; Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 49;
Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C., 47; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Vaughn
69 N. J. -L., 582. In Cooper v. Chicago Organ Co., 58 Ill. App., 248, it
was held, where title in an organ which .was destroyed by fire was retained by the seller, that the loss fell on the purchaser.
In a leading case it was held that there may be a recovery of the
unpaid purchase price for property sold and delivered on condition that
the title shall not pass until full payment is made, although without default of the purchaser the property is destroyed before the price falls
due. In this case the court said the purchaser got just what he bargained
for, the use, possession and enjoyment of the property, with the right to
acquire the absolute title upon payment of the stipulated price, and this
was the consideration for his promise. The seller had done all that he
was to do to or with the property by the terms of the contract-all that
he was to do at all, except to receive the price; and upon that the title
passed without further action from the part of either party. Lavally v.
Bernardo Revanno, Vt. 62, Atl., 47. In Planter's Bank v. Van Dyck, 4
Heisk (Tenn.) 617, the facts were similar to the present case with the
exception that the personal property were slaves who were emancipated,
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and it was held that the loss fell upon the vendee. A case which seems
even stronger than the present case is where on a sale of a pair of horses
title was to remain in the vendor until payment and the vendee assumed
control of the horses, though they remained in the stable of the vendor,
and one of the horses died, it was held that the loss fell on the vendee.
Humellon v. Cherry 23 Hun. (N. Y.) 141. In Pa. we find but one case
which belongs to this first division, it was where a reaper was sold on
a conditional sale, and was to be paid for on the installment plan; the
vendor retained the title until paid, the reaper was destroyed by fire
while in the possession of the vendee and it was held the loss fell on the
vendee. International Harvester Co. v. Stoker, 34 C. C. 186.
Taking now, those cases which hold that the loss follows the title,
and which are commonly regarded as against the weight of authority,
it appears in Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 356, that something more than
payment of purchase money was necessary to effect a transfer of title
since it was agreed that the vendor, upon payment, was to execute a bill
of sale to the vendee.
In J. M. Arthur & Co. v. Blackman, 63 Fed., 536; the contract recited
that the note was given "upon and for the sole consideration that the
said J. M. Arthur & Co. have agreed and promised that, upon the payment
of said note, principal and interest, at maturity, they will sell and transfer (certain described property) ....

it is admitted and agreed that the

said J. M. Arthur & Co. and the legal title thereof is in said J. M. Arthur
& Co. and shall remain in them until they shall make the aforesaid sale
and transfer."
Bishop v. Minderhout, 128 Ala. 162, 52 L. R. A., 395, it appeared
that the parties stipulated that the piano sold should remain the property
of the vendors and subject to their direction: the court declared its adherence to the rule, that the loss follows the title. Cobb v. Tufts, 2 Tex.
App. Civ. Cases; Randle v. Stone, 177 Ga., 501.
Mechan Sales, p. 634, 635; where is said; the question of the effect
of the accidental destruction of the property before it was fully paid for
has also given rise to decisions apparently in conflict. The true view
would seem to be that the loss follows the title. Hence, in the case of
the conditional contract to sell, where no title passes until payment in
full, the loss, unless otherwise provided by the contract would fall upon
the party agreeing to sell; which in the case of a sale upon condition
subsequent, the loss would fall upon the purchaser and so the decisions
are, when not complicated by other facts. At the same time it is possible
that, even in case of a contract of the first kind, the party undertaking
to sell may, by the terms of the agreement, be entitled to recover the sum
agreed to be paid notwithstanding the destruction of the property.
It seems the cases which hold that the loss follows the title, based
their authority on the above quotation, but they failed to read the
complete paragraph.
In Pennsylvania the question has never been decided by the Supreme
Court, where the condition is subsequent in the sale of personal property.
But in a few cases in the sale of land it was held, if between the contract
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of sale and the conveyance a diminution of the value of the land occurs
by means of a fire or other agency, the vendor does not lose the right to
recover the price. The purchaser had the possession, the power to retain
it forever and the power to extinguish whatever simulcarum of ownership
might remain in the seller.. Parcell v, Grosser, 109 Pa., 617; Reed v.
Lukens, 44 Pa., 200.
Therefore where personal property is sold and delivered to the vendee
under an assignment that title is to remain in the vendor until payment,
the loss or destruction of the property while in the possession of the vendee before payment without his default, does not relieve him from the obligation to pay the price.
Judgment for the plaintiff,
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The opinion of the learned court below so well justifies tle judgment,
that it will be unnecessary for us to indulge in any extended discussion.
When A contracts to convey land to B, who takes possession, although the so-called "title" remains in A until payment of the price and
the conveyance, the land is deemed so for B's that whatever increments
or decrements of value it undergoes, affect B only, having no influence
upon his duty to pay the purchase money. Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa., 201;
Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa., 51; Siter's Appeal, 26 Pa., 178. Should the
same principle be extended to a sale of personalty?
After the contract revealed in the present case, although the piano
was to continue to be the "property" of Kemp, it could not continue to
be his "property" in the ordinary way. If it was' Kemp's, it was also
Orbison's. He had a right to the use of it; and to the retention of it
if he paid the installments, and upon paying the last installment, the
shadow of ownership that had been in Kemp would vanish, and a full,
absolute property would attach to Orbison. Until this payment, neither
Kemp nor Orbison fully owned the piano. The interest of each was defeasible by the act of the other. Payments by Orbison would draw over
to him the residual ownership of Kemp. Only on Orbison's defaults,
Kemp could draw back to himself whatever ownership had vested in him.
That a loss if happening to the piano should fall on Orbison seems
appropriate. We may adopt the law as stated by Williston on Sales,
sect. 304. "Where goods are delivered to the buyer but title is retained
by the seller until the price is paid, the buyer immediately acquires the
right to use the goods as his own, and has, indeed, exactly the same
power over them, and right in regard to them, that he would have if he
had bought them and mortgaged them back to secure the price. The
time for payment in such sales frequently extends over months and sometimes over years. It is necessarily to be expected by the parties that the
goods Will deteriorate during the period, and nevertheless that the buyer
will be bound to pay the price. It seems properly to follow that if the
goods are accidently destroyed or injured, the buyer must stand the loss'-that is he must pay the price in full at the time agreed. The decisions
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upon the point are in conflict, but the weight of authority sustains the
view here expressed."
It is needless to cite cases- sustaining this view. Specimens of them
are Chicago R. Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 136 U. S., 268; La
Valley v. Ravenna, 78 Vt., 152; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Vaughn,
69 N. J.L., 582; Exposition Arcade Corporation v. Lit Brothers, 113 Va.,
574; 75 S. E., 117. See also note in 29 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 338.
Affirmed.
BURLESON v. BOROUGH
Forgetfulness as Negligence Per Se-Action for Damages for Personal
Injuries
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In mak<ing repairs in a street, the borough officers and employees
had made a ditch which on the evening of January 7th, at 6 o'clock, was
not covered or. lighted. Having need to do an errand, Mrs. Burleson,
seventy-five years old, started for her home, which faced the street, and
attempted to cross the street, fell into the ditch, seriously injuring herself. The only defense to the action for damages is, the negligence of
plaintiff who an hour before, had seen the open ditch. Her mind was at
the time of crossing the street preoccupied with the errand, and she did
not recall the condition of the street. Her memory and presence of mind
had for several .years been impaired by advancing years. The court
ruled, that if an hour before, she knew of the open excavation, and knew
that no change could have been made in it within the hour, she had been
guilty of contributory negligence. Verdict for defendant.
Basehore, for plaintiff.
Cunningham, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FANSEEN, J. That a municipal corporation, such as a city, borough, township or county, is liable for damages arising from the neglect
of its officers in not keeping the streets, roads and bridges, over which it
has jurisdiction in proper repair, is established by many authorities,
among which are Dean v. New Milford Township, 5 W. & S., 545; Pittsburg v. Grier, 10 Harris, 54; Musselman v. Borough, 202 Pa., 489. These
and other like cases proceed upon the principle that the various municipalities have full and complete control of and power over the roads, streets
and bridges within their several precincts, and that they are charged with
the duty of their proper construction and repair.
In the case at hand the improvements were being made pursuant to
ordinance and by the officers and employees of the borough, and the municipality was bound to maintain such supervision of the work as would
protect the public by day and night from any danger likely to arise
from it. Evans v. Boro. of Brookville, 5 Super. 298; Dougherty v.
Phila., 210 Pa. 591; Canfield v. East Stroudsburg Boro., 19 Super. 649.
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The defendant sets up contributory negligence on part of the plaintiff
as a defence to this action. Where a party himself by his own negligence
contributes to the accident or the occurrence, there the law will not
undertake to separate and distinguish between his negligence and the
amount of it, and the negligence of the other party, but simply says he
cannot recover, so that, if this jury should come to the conclusion that
this plaintiff herself was negligent, and that her negligence was the
occasion to any extent of producing the result of which she complains,
then she will not have a right to recover anything in this case and the
verdict should be for the defendant.
In Struck v. Milwaukee, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 649, it was heldwhere a person injured by stepping into a hole in a sidewalk knew
generally the defective condition of the walk at or near the place of the
accident for some time before the accident occurred, but, at the time,
was thinking of the serious nature of the sickness of a friend he had
just left, and did not have in mind the defective condition of the walk,
and the night was very dark, and the street lights were extinguished,
it cannot be said as a matter of law, that he was guilty of contributory
negligence; the question was properly submitted to the jury, Fritch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. 226. The above case is analogous to the one at bar, and
we are constrained to follow the decision in that case.
West v. Ean Claire, 89 Wis. 31, held, that momentary diversion of
the attention of a pedestrian, does not, as a matter of law constitute
contributory negligence, where he comes into contract with an obstruction in a street and is injured. And where a person knew of the defect
in the street, he was not bound at all times, when passing over it, to
bear the defect in mind, and, if an injury occurred to him when his
attention was momentarily diverted by other matters, the question of
his contributory negligence is one for the jury to decide upon all the
facts; Brown v. White, 206 Pa. 106; Forker v. Sandy Lake, 130 Pa. 123;
Walton v. Calwyn Boro. 19 Super. 172; Crumlich v. Harrisburg, 162
Pa. 624; Strack v. Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 91; 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 638.
The evidence tends to establish all the facts necessary to entitle the
plaintiff to recover, and we believe it is the undoubted province of the jury
to determine whether it did, establish such facts.
Therefore we reverse the ruling of the Court, and enter judgment
for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The sole question before us is, whether the instruction of the trial
court to the jury, was correct, that if the plaintiff an hour before the accident knew of the excavation into which she fell, and knew that no
change could have been made therein within this hour, she had been guilty
of contributory negligence.
The alleged negligence did not consist in not exercising the sense of
sight while crossing the street. It is not alleged that, had she exercised
it, she would have been able to see and would have seen the ditch. The
time was 6 o'clock, P. M., on January 7th. We may judicially know that
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there is at that season no sunlight. It is not shown that there was any
artificial light. The plaintiff when crossing the street, was obliged to
"walk by faith," by the faith that there was solid ground on which, when
she planted them thereon, her feet would rest.
It cannot be said to be negligence not to suspect that the street has
been longitudinally gashed by a ditch, when one has no notice of-it, other
than its possibility.
But the plaintiff had, an hour before, seen this ditch. She had however forgotten it, when she was crossing the street. Her external conduct contains no element of negligence. She was not unduly hasty; she
omitted nothing observance of which, at the time, would have avoided the
accident. Her negligence, if she was negligent, consisted in such an
operation of the brain machinery, as failed to project into consciousness
the memory of a fact observed an hour before. What could she have
done, to avert the obliviscence of the impression? Is it clear that she
could have done anything? The brain has its laws. States of consciousness are far from coming and going only in obedience to volitions.
The volitions themselves are conditioned by sensations and perceptions,
by imagination and memory. Her recollection of the ditch would have
caused a different series of voluntary acts. The memory is causative of
acts. What is causative of the memory
Does culpa inhere in acts of
will, or in other acts and states?
The cephalic machinery even in young persons, will not always
work as we could wish. It undergoes deterioration with age, just as do
the heart, the lungs, the eyes, the ears. Are we to say that a man with
bad eyes is negligent, if he does not see what a man with good eyes would,
under the circumstances, have seen? Equally unreasonable would it be
to hold a woman 75 years old, to a duty of remembering a recent occurrence, which a woman of 30 or 40 would have remembered. The memory
of the plaintiff is proved to have been impaired for several years. Are
the old and oblivious to be without the protection of the law, because of
their infirmity? Is no duty to be owed to them of care to avoid injury to
them, by making their defects of mind, superinduced by years, a bar to
an action for damages?
There are degrees of youth which preclude capacity for negligence.
There is just as good a reason for protecting the very aged as the very
young.
But, whether the plaintiff was negligent or not, should be decided not
by the court, but the jury. In deciding it in this case, the judge arrogated to himself the function of the jury. In Reynolds v. Los Angeles
Gas Co., 162 Cal., 327, Henshaw, J., holding that it was as matter of law
negligence on the part of the plaintiff there to act as did the plaintiff in
this case, observes that "She was subjected to no peril, stress or strain;
no haste was imposed upon her; no excuse for her forgetfulness was
shown." When a man has a bad memory, what "excuse" for it is needed?
Can he any more remake it than he can remake his! liver, or his eyes, or his
lungs? The same censoriousness that is directed towards mental defects
will probably soon be extended to physical, for in truth, to blame for the
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former is neither less absurd nor less ungenerous, than to blame for the
latter.
While different courts have taken a different view of the question presented here, we prefer to follow those who declare that forgetfulness is
not per se negligence; and that whether, in any particular case it is
negligence, must be determined by the jury. See note, 29 Am. & Eng..
Ann. Cases, 36. Affirmed.
REX v. STEVENS
Jurisdiction of a Justice of Peace-Set off in an Action Before a Justice
of the Peace Cannot Exceed $300-A Book Account is An Indivisible
Cause of Action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
tefore a Justice of the Peace, Rex sued Stevens on a book account
for $267. Stevens had a book account against Rex for goods bought at
various times. One purchase was of $24 worth, a later one for $57, a
later one for $25, a later one for $137, and a later one for $214. Stevens
offered all of the book account but the last item of $214.
The justice admitted the offer. On appeal, the Common Pleas held
that since the whole account was $457 and exceeded $300, the justice had
no jurisdiction of the set-off, and should have allowed the plaintiff's claim
without reduction.
D. Davis, for plaintiff.
Evans, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RAKER, J. This suit was originated before a justice of the peace,
and came into court of common pleas on appeal.
The principal ground of defense was that the justice of the peace had
no jurisdiction, in allowing Stevens to claim set-off against Rex, when his
whole account against Rex exceeded $300 which is the limit of jurisdiction in a justice's court.
The question in this case is, whether the common pleas court, was
correct in holding that this is the case in which a justice of the peace
did not have jurisdiction of set-off and should have allowed the plaintiff's
claim without reduction.
In order to determine the jurisdiction of the justice we must have
some test. The test in a case involving jurisdiction in regard to the
amount is, "the sum demanded."
From the facts of the case we see that altho the account which Stevens has against Rex is for $457, he did not make any such demand; on the
contrary it was Rex who is demanding $267 from Stevens and is the one
who brings the case within the jurisdiction of the justice.
However it is not questioned whether the justice had jurisdiction in
the claim made by Rex, but even if Stevens had brought a suit against
Rex, he could be within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, by al-
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lowing or crediting Rex with $267, and thus reduce his claim to $190.
McFarland v. O'Neil, 155 Pa., 260.
Mutual dealings are evidenced by mutual accounts, and accounts are
mutual, when each party makes charges against the other in his books for
property sold, services rendered, money advanced, etc. McFarland v.
O'Neil, 155 Pa., 260.
It is also held that a justice of the peace has jurisdiction where the
claim however large, is reduced to or below, the .statutory limit by direct
payment or by dealings amounting to and admitted as payment. If
this is true there is no reason or justice, why Stevens should not be allowed to split his book account and use a part as a set-off, in order to
save the amount which he would have to pay Rex.
Furthermore if Stevens can be compelled to pay the $267 to Rex, he
would have to bring a separate action to recover on his book account, and
in the meantime Rex could become insolvent, and Stevens would be a
great los-er; whereas by permitting a set-off, Stevens is protected to a
great extent from such results.
The reason for set-off given by many authors and writers on the subject is that it prevents a multiplicity of suits.
In this case this reason probably does not apply as Stevens would have
to bring a separate action, whether he would be compelled to pay the
$267, or whether he would be allowed to set-off, and bring suit for balance.
Since we have cases where Stevens would be within the jurisdiction
of a justice of the peace, if he were suing Rex by allowing reduction of
$267, we think, he was entitled to a set-off in the case at bar, and common
pleas court erred in holding that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction in allowing set-off.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The book account must be treated as an indivisible cause of action.
Had suit been brought by the defendant for $24, or $57, or $25, there could
not have been a successful later suit for the residue of the account. Buck
v. Wilson, 113 Pa., 423; Logan v. Caffney, 30 Pa., 196.
The defendant's claim by book account being then an "entire" claim,
no portion of it could be remitted, for the purpose of giving jurisdiction
over it to the justice. Cases cited in 2 Stewart's Purd., p. 2092.
The same limit to the jurisdiction, based on amount, exists with respect to the plaintiff's claim, and the defendant's counterclaim. The latter must not, nor must the former, exceed $300. The defendant's set-off
being greater than $300, no portion of it could be considered by the justice.
Hence the plaintiff should have recovered the whole of his claim without reduction on account of the defendant's set-off. Judgment for the
plaintiff for $267 and interest.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

NOBLE v. McPHERSON
Contract Between Attorney and Client-Void as Against Public Policy
When by its Terms it Endeavors to Prevent the Client from Settling
the Cause on in Own Initiative.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, an Attorriey-at-Law, recovered $1000 in the lower court in
a suit for damages against defendant for breach of contract. Defendant
was injured in a railroad accident and employed plaintiff to act as Attorney, who declined to do anything until defendant, in writing, agreed
not to employ any other attorney, and not to settle with the Railroad Co.
except through him. In violation of the agreement defendant settled with
the Railroad Co. for $500. His injuries were very serious, and had the
suit been prosecuted to a verdict, and judgment, he could have recovered
at least $2500. The contract gave to plaintiff one-half of what should be
recovered.
Barrett, for plaintiff.
Fanseen, for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
BURNS, J. The important question in the case and that to which
most of the argument has been directed is whether the contract upon
which plaintiff declares is void as! being against public policy or otherwise. The defendant affirms. Plaintiff denies.
Are such contracts void as against public policy? We answer, yes.
In the clear and precise opinion of Wright, J., in the case of Boardman against Thompson, 25 Iowa, 501, he sets forth: "We are aware that
it has been said that this (public policy) is in its nature uncertain and
fluctuating, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree of
exactness; that it is an unruly horse, which, once astride, you know not
where it will carry; that it may lead from sound law.
And yet courts in all countries have more or less to do with it in all
their deliberations. From the earliest times, contracts! have been declared
void as against public.policy. It varies we know with the growth of society; it is being constantly modified and changed by the habits of our
people and the usages of trade; and it is right that it should be so. And
with these changes the courts' must keep pace, not riding recklessly, but
cautiously, and, if possible safety; not being led "from sound law" but the
more certainly to its just true and enlightened exposition. The best and
most expedient rules may be pushed to such extremes, and applied to such
cases, as to produce the greatest hardships.
So too, those lights usually the most reliable, may and will at times
betray and mislead. It is for those administering these rules, and guided
by their'lights, to so apply and use them as that the law may be upheld in
its purity, the rights of all protected, and .public confidence in its efficacy
to prevent wrong and fraud, maintained unimpaired.
In Vol. 3, 2d ed., A. & E. Cyc., 331, it sets forth that a client may, at
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any stage of the case, compromise or dismiss his action or suit even
though his attorney may object. The authority of an attorney being revocable at the pleasure of his client, he cannot object to any course the
client may choose to take; he does! not acquire any vested interest in the
cause which is affected by the dismissal of the suit.
But client's action does not affect attorney's right to compensation
(Lavender v. Atkins, 20 Neb., 206), (Roberts v. Doty, 31 Hun., N. Y.,
128, in absence of fraud or collusion to injure the attorney), (Stephens v.
Nashville R. R., 10 Lea, Tenn., 448).
Equity regards the relation of attorney and client much in the same
light as that of guardian and ward, and will relieve a client from hard
bargains or from any undue advantage secured over him by his attorney.
(Week's Attorneys-at-Law, § 268).
Where the contract provides that no compromise or settlement of the
case shall be made without the consent of the attorney, it has been held
in some of the states, that such a condition is contra bonos mores, and
the contract void. (Weackly v. Hall, 13 Stanton, Ohio, 175), (Taylor v.
Gilman, 58 N. H., 417), (Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487). Though
in others, such condition has been held not to be against public policy.
(Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Cal., 564).
In Murray's Estate, 2 D. R., 681, it was held that public policy forbids an Attorney-at-law, agreeing for a contingent fee, should so arrange
with his client for an interest in the subject matter of the litigation as to
preclude the client from compromising or settling the case without the
consent of the attorney.
In Lee v. The Vacuum Oil Co., (126 N. Y., 579), it was held that an
agreement between an attorney and client giving the attorney a percentage of any recovery, does not deprive the client of the right to control the
management of his own cause and to determine when the litigation shall
cease. The client still remains the lawful owner of the cause of action
and is not bound to continue or to permit the continuance of the litigation
for the benefit of his attorney when he judges! it prudent to stop, provided
he is willing and able to satisfy the jusf claim of the attorney.
In 45 L. R. A., (0. S.), in an Arkansas Supreme Court case it was
held that a clause in a contract between an attorney and client for compensation for conducting litigation, that the client shall not settle the controversy without the attorney's consent is void because against public
policy.
Believing that this contract is invalid-that it comes within the rules
and is liable to the objections stated-we have not hesitated to so conclude
though we most frankly admit that there is nothing to show the least
taint of fraud or the use of undue influence on part of plaintiff. Ours is
the duty to declare the law, not for one case alone, but for all those to
which the subject under discussion may be applicable. Looking to this
alone, while we by no means hold that it is not competent for an attorney to contract for what may be shown to be a fair contingent fee, we
nevertheless feel constrained to conclude that these contracts provide for
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something more than this, that they cannot be upheld, and that the lower
court erred in holding that plaintiff could recover.
Judgment below is reversed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The defendant agreed not to employ any other attorney than the plaintiff and not to settle with the Railroad Company, except through the
plaintiff. He likewise agreed that the plaintiff should have one-half of
the sum that might be recovered. Had the suit been prosecuted to judgment, $2500 would have been recovered. The client has causdd a settlement to be made for $500. The plaintiff might therefore have received
$2500, instead of $1250. His loss is $1000.
A client does not surrender his right to discontinue a suit or settle
a claim, for the reason that he has employed an attorney to collect it.
He is liable to the attorney for a fair compensation, whether the suit is
pressed to judgment or not.
The fact that the contract compensation is to be apportioned to the
amount recovered does not preclude an acceptance by the client of whatever sum he chooses to take,and can secure.
The learned court below has properly decided, we think, that the
client should not be prevented from settling claims, by any contract
to do so, or not to do so, without the attorney's consent, that he may
make. Such contract must be deemed void. It will support no action.
Barthel v. Chicago R. R. Co., 138 Ia.. 688; Kauffman v. Phillips, 154 Ia.,
542; 134 N. W., 575; Burho v. Carmichiel, 117 Minn., 211; 135 N. W.,
386. With Seely, P. J., Murray's Estate, 2 Dist., 681, "We think a sound
public policy, one which duly regards the purpose for which courts are
established, and the relation of attorneys to the courts and their clients,
and of parties to each other, forbids that an attorney, besides agreeing for
a contingent fee should so arrange with his client as to preclude him from
negotiating with his adversary and agreeing upon [to him] satisfactory
terms of settlement of the controversy."
The judgment of the learned court below must be affirmed.
PHILLIPS v. R. R. Co.
Agency-Degree of Care-Common Carried-Care to be Exercised by
Ticket Agent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Phillips is unable to reid, he showed defendant's agent a strip of
paper on which was the name of the place to which he wanted to be carried. Agent sold him a ticket calling for a different place. In an action
for damages the court told the jury that defendant's agent was bound to
use only ordinary care in selling tickets. Motion for a new trial.
Powell for plaintiff.
Standemneyer for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROCKMAKER, J. This case comes before the court on a motion for
a new trial by plaintiff on the ground that the court erred in instructing
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the jury that the defendant's agent was bound only to use ordinary care
in selling tickets. The pertinent question is therefore, how much care
should the ticket agent have exercised in selling Phillips, a man who was
unable to read, a ticket?
The able counsel for the defendant argues with much force that the
relationship of carrier and passenger does not exist before the purchase of
a ticket, hence the degree of care which a carrier and its agents must use
towards passengers is not applicable in this case. With this argument
we must disagree. The relationship of carrier and passenger commences
when a person with bonafide intention of taking passage and with the
express or implied consent of the carrier places himself in a situation to
avail himself of the facilities of transportation which the carrier offers.
In case of a R. R. this relation arises not merely when the passenger enters
the train with the ticket already purchased, but when he enters the premises of the carrier with the intention to take a train in due course, 191 Pa.,
102; 89 Ill. App., 335; 39 Ind., 568; 142 Mo., 535; 63 N. J. L., 356, et alia.
The previous purchase of a ticket is not essential to the beginning of the
relationship of carrier and passenger, where it is not by the rules or known
usage of the company made a condition precedent to the acceptance of the
passenger, 142 Pa., 617; 98 Ga., 494; 170 Ill., 417; 87 Mo. App., 203.
Nor is the defendant's contention, that plaintiff was not accepted as a
passenger, tenable, because a carrier of passengers has an outstanding
offer to carry all persons who present themselves in proper condition,
ready and willing to pay their fare at a proper time and place. Persons
so presenting themselves must be accepted as passengers, Goddard on
Bailments, 344. That the plaintiff was accepted as a passenger before he
purchased the ticket is quite evident because, "those who by express or
implied assent are waiting in the passenger room for the departure of a
train, provided their acts are such as are presumed to be known and assented to by the agents of the R. R. Co. having authority in the matter,
regardless of whether or not a ticket has been purchased, if no rule and
regulation of the company is being violated, are accepted as passengers,
86 Me., 261; 63 Md., 135; 171 Mass., 33; 36 Fed., 72; 25 N. Y. App. Div.,
365. A carrier rarely expressly accepts a passenger, Godd on Bailments,
325. From all these authorities and from the facts of the case it is quite
obvious that the relationship of carrier and passenger existing before
Phillips purchased the ticket, since he was in no sense an unacceptable
passenger.
Now the question arises, how much care should the ticket agent have
exercised in selling the plaintiff a ticket, or must a ticket agent use ordinary or extraordinary care in selling tickets? It is an indisputable rule
that a carrier must exercise the utmost care in protecting and guarding
passengers from every danger which extreme vigilance can prevent, Meiers
v. Pa. R. R., 64 Pa., 225. So it would seem that the case at bar falls within this rule, but that is not so, because the rule generally applies to bodily
injuries, and not to such consequential injuries which the plaintiff in this
case might have suffered. In 23 Pa., 147, it was held "that railroad companies are answerable in action of tort for the direct and immediate con-
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sequences of errors committed by themselves or caused by negligence of
themselves or agents. This is about the nearest case resembling the one
before us. There was an error committed by the defendant's agent in
giving the plaintiff the wrong ticket, but was the error caused by negligence, and if so, what constitutes negligence on the part of a ticket
agent? Can it be the failure to use extraordinary care? We think not,
for were that the case, there would be no necessity, for the court to say
.caused by negligence of themselves or agents." If extraordinary care
.must be exercised by a ticket agent the court should have said "for errors
committed by themselves or agents." That would then indicate that the
company is liable for any error, regardless of whether or not it was the
result of negligence. And if that were the case, a ticket agent would certainly be compelled to use extraordinary care. But the court uses the
words "caused by negligence," we must therefore justly infer froni that
extraordinary care is not required in selling tickets.
Furthermore, extraordinary care by a ticket agent in selling tickets is
a most unreasonable demand. What rational being would demand extraordinary care of the ticket agent in the Grand Central Station in New
York City, at which station thousands upon thousands of people daily purchase tickets? It would not only drive the unfortunate being into some
form of insanity, but would also cause a great hardship to the public in
delaying trains and preventing them from running on schedule time. It
may be said that this is an extreme case, but it is by an extreme case that
the soundness of a principle is to be tested.
"A passenger is bound to take notice of the conditions printed on his
ticket." Cresson v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 11 Phila., 597. Certainly,
the name of the place where the ticket calls for may, at least, be considered
6ne of the conditions of the ticket. In the light of this doctrine it would
seem strange to hold that the ticket agent must use extraordinary care
and yet hold "the passenger bound to notice the conditions printed on his
ticket." Isn't this comewhat inconsistent? If the ticket agent must use
extraordinary care, and the passenger knows this-for we are all bound to
know the lawv-why hold the passengers to the conditions of his ticket,
regardless of his noticing them or not? There is but one solution of this
inconsistency, and that is the elimination of extraordinary care on the part
of the ticket agent.
Ordinary care is such care and attention as a person of prudence
would exercise under similar circumstances. Here we have a man approaching the ticket agent and handing him a slip of paper on which is
written the name of the place whereto he desires to be carried. Must
the agent be an exceptionally clever man to infer that the passenger is
in some way incapacitated? That he couldn't read, the facts expressly
state, and probably he was also unable to speak English, for what else
could be the reason of his not asking for the ticket as people ordinarily
do? Did he seek amusement or did he attempt to amuse the ticket agent
by so doing? Evidently. not. Hence under similar circumstances, any
ordinary man would use a little more precaution in this case than he generally does under other circumstances. And what constitutes ordinary
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care is a question of fact to be decided by the jury from the circumstances
and facts of the case. The court is not desirous of criticising the verdict
of the jury, but it seems that if reasonable or ordinary care were used by
the agent, the mistake would not have happened, and extraordinary care
is altogether unnecessary. The court is not however, asked to decide
whether or not the agent used ordinary care, but what degree of care he
should have used. From the above authorities and reasoning we are
therefore bound to say that a ticket agent in selling tickets is bound to
use only ordinary care. And since this is the question on which the
motion rests, a new trial must therefore be refused, and the charge of the
lower court affirmed.
QPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Phillips, the plaintiff, showed the ticket agent a slip of paper on which
was the name of the station to which he desired to be carried. The agent
gave him a ticket calling for a different station. The agent made a mistake. This mistake (1) may have occurred in the making or (2) in the
performance of the contract of carriage.
The mistake may have been made in the performance of the contract.
The agent may have interpreted the writing on the paper as calling for
the station for which the writer, and passenger, intended it should call and
by mistake may have given the passenger a ticket calling for another
station.
If this were the case, there was a meeting of minds, from which a
contract to carry to the station named on the paper would arise, and for
the mistake of one of its agents in performing an essential part of this
contract, viz., furnishing the passenger with a proper ticket, the railroad
company would be absolutely liable. Thus in Lawshe v. R. R., 29 Wash.,
681; 70 Pac., 118 it is said, "A person who makes a valid contract is entitled to transportation according to its terms tho the face of the ticket
furnished him may not in any true sense express the contract. It is the
contract, and not the ticket, that gives the right to transportation. The
ticket is but evidence of the contract made out and furnished by the carrier; and if it fails to disclose the contract the fault is with the carrier
and it is responsible for the natural consequences of the variance. Thru
the plain every day law governing agency the company is liable for the
acts of its agent and for his mistakes."
The same doctrine is asserted in Georgia R. R. v. Dogherty (Ga.),
12 S. E., 747, where it is said, "Where a railroad company undertakes
to sell tickets and has an agency for that purpose and they give a wrong
ticket and injury ensues the company is liable. The law places upon the
company thrn its agents the responsibility of giving the ticket applied for."
And in Evansville R. R. v. Cates (Ind.), 41 N. E., 712, the court,
quoting Woodson Railroads, vol. 3, sec. 349, says, "When a passenger
asks for a certain ticket, and the station agent by mistake gives him a
different one, which does not entitle him to the 'passage desired, the company is liable." To the same effect are Thompson on Negligence, sec.
2589, Illinois R. R. v. Jackson, 117 Ky., 910; 79 S. W., 1187, True v.
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C. 0. (W. Va.), 21 S. E., 1022. The same doctrine is clearly and forcefully stated in Texas v. Wynn (Tex.) 97 S. W., sec. 14 L. R. A.
N. S., 465n.
The mistake may have occurred in the making of the contract. The
agent may have interpreted the writing as calling for a ticket to a station
other than that for which the writer and passenger intended it should call.
If this were the case, there would be no .neeting of the minds, and, therefore, no contract, unless the mistake of the agent was not reasonable,
and the mistake of the agent would be reasonable if it were not due to
the lack of ordinary care. See Clark on Contracts, 196 et seq. Por. Eq.
sec. 860n; Taplin v. James, L. R. 15 chan. div., 215; 1 Ames. Cas. Eq.,
388. "Where the terms are so ambiguous that the defendant could reasonably, and did in fact put a different meaning upon them than the plaintiff, it is clear that there never was the requisite consensus ad idem, and
no valid contract in law or in equity." Pom. Eq., vol. 6, p. 1302.
In this case, therefore, if the mistake of the agent in interpreting the
writing was not due to the lack of ordinary care, there was no contract
and, consequently, by the delivery of a ticket to a destination not intended
by the passenger, the company committed no breach of contract. On the
other hand, if the mistake was due to the lack of ordinary care on the part
of the agent, there was a breach of contract for which the company is
liable.
A railroad company, however, is a common carrier, and is bound by
law not only to perform the contracts which it has made, but also
to make contract with any one who so desires. It is under a legal duty
not only to perform but also to make contracts. In performing its duty
to make contracts it is bound to exercise ordinary care only. "The high
degree of care owing by the carrier as to the. means and measures for the
passengers safety does not apply in the matter of making the contract of
carriage but in making said contract by the sale of a ticket the carrier
is bound to exercise ordinary care only." Texas, etc., R. R. v. Wiggins, 156 L. W., 113. The considerations which have dictated the rule
requiring a career to exercise the highest degree of care in performing
those duties, neglect of which may result in personal injuiry to the. passenger, are obviously inapplicable to the carrier's duty to make contract.
Prom the foregoing it follows that the instruction of the trial court
was correct if the mistake of the agent occurred in the making of the contract -and erroneous if the mistake occurred in the performance of the contract. The appellant has not shown that the latter was the case and the
judgment of the learned court below is therefore affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. SLOCUM
A Defendant in a Criminal Prosecution Where He Has Offered no Evidence of Good Character, Cannot Have the Court Charge the Jury,
That They Shall Assume the Character of the Defendant to be Good.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Slocum, tried for murder offered no evidence concerning his good
character. He asked the court, however to tell the jury, that it was
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their duty to assume that his character had be~n good, since there was
no evidence to the contrary. This the court refused to do, saying that
since there was no evidence upon that subject the jury must refuse to
make any assumption in regard to it.
A conviction following, a new trial is sought.
Raker, for defendant.
Walsh for commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MOROSINI, J. This is a motion for a new trial on the ground that
the court erred in refusing to tell the jury that it was their duty to assume that Slocum the defendant, had been of good character because there
was no evidence that his character had been bad. To permit such a presumption of good character to be raised because he had not adduced any
evidence as to his character would be a palpable evasion of well settled
rules.
In Commonwealth v. Weber, 167 Pa., 153, it was held, "The previous
character of one charged with a crime has no bearing whatever on his
guilt unless he chooses to make it the subject of consideration by attempts to prove a good character, and if he does not do this, as in this
case, the Commonwealth can offer no evidence on the subject."
A failure of one upon trial for a criminal offense to call witnesses to
establish his general good character raises no presumption of either good
or bad character. State v. Dockstader, 42 Iowa, 436.
A defendant is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty.
The defendant had the legal right to introduce testimony in support of
his character, and the fact that he failed to do so is a circumstance that
may be considered with all the other testimony in the case, in determining
the question of guilt.
The law is well settled that a party charged with the commission
of a crime may give evidence of his good character, but his character is
not in issue, nor can the prosecution offer evidence of general bad character of the accused until defendant has offered evidence of his good character. Greenleaf on evidence par. 25, 26.
But the fact that the prosecution can offer no evidence as to the
character of the accused until he himself puts his character in issue
does not infer that the jury is to presume that the defendant is of good
character, for he may have the blackest character and by refraining to put
in issue withhold that fact from the jury, and if a presumption of good
character was raised, receive the benefit of it.
The defendant if he wishes the jury to take in consideration the fact
that he has had a good character, has the right to introduce witnesses to
testify in his behalf. The accused may always invoke his good character
as tending to disprove his commission'of the offense and no matter -how
strong the evidence is against him. Moreover if the accused has offered
his good character, the prosecution may in reply introduce his bad character; not so much by the way of exception to the rule above mentioned as
in order to prevent the accused from imposing upon the tribunal by false
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evidence of good character. Greenleaf on Evidence, p. 39. It can be
readily seen that if the defendant is to be allowed to refrain from putting
his character in issue and then to have a Presumption of good character
raised, the above rule would be defeated, for instead of imposing upon the
tribunal by false evidence of good character, he would impose by a false
presumption.
Where no evidence of general character has been given, the subject
is not one for the consideration of the jury. 1 Denio, (N. Y.), 281.
Where no evidence as to the character of the defendant is introduced
an instruction that the'character of every defendant in a criminal case
is conclusively presumed to be good, is too strong. State v. Smith, 50
Kansas, 69.
In Donner v. State, 54 Ala., 127, it was held, "While it is true that the
law presumes every one to be innocent until the contrary appears by evidence, it does not presume everyone to have a good character. It presumes nothing in respect to a defendant's general reputation. In the absence of all proof on the subject, his character is not to be taken as either
good or bad, and the jury are not authorized by assuming that it is one or
the other, to let it have weight in inclining them towards either his acquittal or his conviction.
Therefore it seems that the court was correct in refusing to instruct
the jury that a presumption was to be raised of good character.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is held in a number of jurisdictions that, in absence of any evidence
as to the character of the defendant in a criminal case, there is a presumption that he is of good character, and that, upon the request of the defendant, the jury should be so instructed. Mullen v. U. S., 106 Fed., 892;
S v. McAllister, 24 Me., 139. This doctrine is approved by some of the
text writers. 1 Bishop Crim. Proc., 1112; Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, 520.
The contrary doctrine is asserted by the great majority of the State
courts and is approved by the most distinguished writers. (See 24 Am.
& Eng. Ann. Cases, 407, collecting the cases). Commenting upon the
case of Mullen v. U. S., supra, Wigmore says, "This inconsistently
gives him the untrammeled benefit of evidence which if he had introduced
might have been disputed." Wigmore on Evidence 290. The New York
Court of Appeals, in a recent well considered case adopted the rule asserted by the majority and, criticising the rule adopted by the minority,
said, "Under it the accused may always have the benefit of a very influential presumption which he can invariably prevent the prosecution
from rebutting at his own will. To hold that this alleged presumption
of good character exists would be to give unfair advantage to the defendant uncalled for by any consideration of justice or even extreme solicitude on account of the difficulties which sometimes beset an accused person in establishing his defense. The true doctrine is that there is no presumption one way or the other. The defendant's character is simply a
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non existent quantity in the evidence." P. v. Lingley, 207 N. Y., 396;
101 N. E., 170.
Most of the text writers and judges who assert the existence of the
presumption of good character support their contention by the argument
that the presumption forms a part of the presumption of innocence and
is necessarily involved therein. The fallacy of this argument is obvious.
The presumption of innocence is always open to attack by the prosecution
and if the presumption of good character were a part of the presumption
of innocence the prosecutor would be at liberty to assail this presumption
also, irrespective of the introduction of any evidence on the subject by
the defendant; yet this, the prosecution is nowhere permitted to do.
Judgment affirmed.

BOOK ]REVIEW
The Law of Municipal Corporations by Roger W. Cooley, LL.M.
Published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1914.
Dillon, Abbott and McQuillan have by the voluminousness of their
works helped lawyers to realize what a vast mass of adjudication and
legislation on the subject of this book has been emitted by the courts and
the legislatures of the American States. The object of Prof. Cooley's
book is stated by him to be to "present in concise form the general principles of the law of municipal corporations " to give a concise treatment
of their principles. The text contains 585 pages and in 18 chapters, discusses the destinction between public and private corporations, the creation of municipal corporations, legislative control of them, the alteration and dissolution of them, the charter, the proceedings and ordinances
of the governing body, their officers and agents, contracts, improvements,
police powers, streets, sewers, public buildings, torts committed by municipalities, their debts, funds, etc.. taxation, action by and against them,
quasi-corporations, under which title counties, townships, school districts, etc., are treated.
The book is designed primarily for law school use, but it must prove
serviceable to practitioners, in reviving their memories, with respect to
points in the law of municipal corporations and in quickly suggesting to them a number of relevant authorities.
The table of cases
reveals a prodigious number of them, hardly fewer than 7700.

